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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
1-'\M,'\!ll\ SORENSON, 
vs. 
STEVE M. ALLER, JAMES J. HILL, 
and FRED A. MORETON & COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
vs. 
Defendants, Third-Party 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 





STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The issue before the court is whether the Utah 
Guest Statute bars a tort-feasor's contribution action 
against a host driver whose guest passenger was injured as a 
result of the concurring negligence of the tort-feasor and 
the host driver. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court entered judgment for contribution 
in favor of tort-feasor respondents Hill and Moreton and 
ogainst third-party defendant host driver Mcconaghy. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the lowc>r c01 11 , 
judgment for contribution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree with appellant's statement oE 
facts, except the respondents submit that there was an issue 
as to whether ice caused appellant McConaghy's vehicle toga 
out of control. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE GUEST STATUTE DOES NOT EXPRESSLY 
PROHIBIT THE MAINTENANCE OF A CONTRIBU-
TION ACTION, AND THE EQUITIES DEMAND 
CONTRIBUTION IN THE CASE AT BAR. 
Examination of the Guest Statute, Section 41-9-1, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), in procedural or substantive 
terms is a semantic exercise that can only produce 
conflicting, unclear, and unsatisfactory decisions. The 
better approach is to simply look at the underlying policies 
barring the original action and determine whether these 
policies would be violated by third-parties seeking contri-
bution. If it is clear that the policies would not be 
harmed by the third-party action, contribution should be 
allowed. Policy grounds behind the Utah Guest Statute do 
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.1·•' apply to third-party actions for contribution, and the 
r decision should be upheld. 
This court has previously addressed contribution 
iss1Jes in the contexts of workmen's compensation and intra-
family immunity, denying contribution in the former and 
allowing it in the latter. 
This court has consistently held that a party can-
not seek contribution from the plaintiff's employer covered 
by the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, Sections 35-1-1 et 
Utah Code Ann. (1953). (Curtis v. Harmon Electronic, 
Inc., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976) and Phillips v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, 614 P. 2d 153 (Utah 1980)). In denying 
contribution in these cases, this court recognized that tort 
law and workmen's compensation are founded on differing 
social policies. Whereas tort law premises liabi-
lity upon fault, the workmen's compensation statute bases 
liability solely upon the occurrence of an employment-
related injury. The imposition of strict liability upon the 
employer assures the economic security of the employee, who 
would otherwise face the delay, expense, and risk inherent 
in attempting to prove the employer's negligence. (Buhler 
v. Gassner, 530 P. 2d 803 (Utah 197 5) and State Tax 
Commission v. Department of Finance, 576 P. 2d 1297 (Utah 
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1978)). Since the employer is strictly 1 iabl'" und•?r t:, 
statute, the legislature has 
liability in tort, including 
wise, the employer would be 
immunized the employer from ,, 
cortribution. Were it othPt 
subjected to the inequity of 
having to pay twice for the employee's injury. 
this 
P. 2d 
In contrast to the workmen's compensation cases, 
court upheld contribution in 
864 (Utah 1981), where the 
Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 
third-party defendant 
claimed immunity under the intra-family immunity doctrine. 
In Bishop, this court defined a "joint tort-feasor" to be 
any party who is culpable for an injury whether or not the 
injured person can rr.aintain an action for damages against 
that party. The court emphasized that contribution is an 
equitable remedy between joint tort-feasors and that the 
equities in permitting contribution outweighed the possible 
disruption of domestic harmony, the policy supporting the 
claimed immunity. 
The difference in result between the workmen's 
compensation cases and Bishop is explained by the impact 
that contribution would have had on the policies justifying 
the immunities claimed. Whereas allowing contribution in 
the workmen's compensation cases would have disrupted the 
legislative program defining employer liability and led to 
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i '''"liJ i table results, the same was not true in Bishop where 
,,,, 'U>ution had no significant impact on the social policy 
-"PP''rting intra-family immunity and met the demands of 
equity. 
Allowing contribution in the case at bar will not 
violate the express terms of the Guest Statute or frustrate 
the policies supporting the statute. The Guest Statute, 
generally, bars any action or recovery by the passenger 
against his host. By permitting contribution, this court 
will not defeat that bar, but will still uphold the right of 
the host to not be sued by or pay anything to his pass-
enger. 
The immunity claimed by the appellant here is simi-
lar to intra-family immunity. Like intra-family immunity, 
the Guest Statute prohibits a party from bringing a direct 
action against another party due to a social relationship 
between the parties which the law desires to foster. Unlike 
the workmen's compensation statute the Guest Statute does 
not create a new liability for the host and has no language 
indicating that the host's protection is absolute. The 
Guest Statute should not be used as a shield in this third-
party action to frustrate the equities recognized by the 
court in Bishop. 
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The concept of contribution is based upon t',e 
equitable principle that where two or more par ti"'" cont, 1 
bute to an injury they should share the liability and cncr 
of their negligence in proportion to their fault. 
forth by the lower court in this case: 
It would be inequitable to require a 
tort-feasor to bear the entire cost of an 
injury he may have only partially caused, 
or to pay more than his share based on 
the degree of fault. The purpose of the 
contribution act is to relieve this ine-
quity. Memorandum decision, Honorable 
David B. Dee, March 29, 1982. 
As set 
The respondents have already paid the plaintiff 100 percent 
of her damages by virtue of Section 78-27-41(1), Utah Code 
Ann. (1953) which provides: 
Nothing in this act shall affect: (1) 
The common-law liability of the several 
joint-tortfeasors to have judgment reco-
vered, and payment made, from them indivi-
dually by the injured person for the 
whole injury. However, the recovery of 
a judgment by the injured person against 
one joint-tortfeasor does not discharge 
the other joint-tortfeasors. 
The plaintiff, therefore, has no interest whatsoever in this 
contribution action, and it is vacuous for the appellant to 
assert that the plaintiff should not be allowed to do 
indirectly that which she is not permitted to do directly. 
Obviously, the respondents, who have paid the entire 
judgment, are the only interested parties and, by this 
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c.·ontribution action, are merely attempting to assert their 
1u i table rights to prevent a windfall to the appellant 
whose culpability represents 60 percent of plaintiff's dama-
ges. 
Allowing contribution will not prejudice the policy 
supporting the Guest Statute. This court has stated that 
the Guest s ta tu te encourages hospitality between the host 
driver and non-paying guest, thereby reducing traffic and 
promoting fuel conservation. (Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P. 2d 
883 (Utah 1974) and Critchley v. Vance, 575 P.2d 187 (Utah 
1978)). Surely the social policy supporting the Guest 
Statute is less significant than the social policy involved 
in Bishop. The relationship between a parent and child is 
much closer than between a driver and guest. In the former 
relationship the parties live in close proximity, see each 
other daily, and are more intimate. Yet th is court in 
Bishop held that the relationship between these family mem-
bers would not be upset by the third-party contribution 
action. This same rationale should, therefore, apply with 
the occasional driver-guest association. 
has concluded that the family would not 
greater force to 
Since this court 
suffer disharmony as a result of the third-party suit, it is 
difficult to discern how a greater protection should be 
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afforded to maintaining the hospitality between a host and 
guest during a brief ride. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should permit contribution in this 
action. The Guest Statute does not expressly prohibit 
contribution actions, and upholding the equitable right 
contribution will prevent a windfall to appellant. 
Respectfully submitted this )!J_ day of July, 1983. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Jay E. Jensen 
M. Dquglas Bayly 
/ 
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